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PREFACE
Unlike many other Latin American countries, M exico has not 
experienced a military takeover in the last  fifty y e a rs .  This paper will 
present some of the reasons why the M exican military has not resorted 
to a coup d 'e ta t ,  yet has established its role in the affairs of the 
country.
To bring these reasons to light the writer will look at military and
\
non-military functions of the M exican armed fo rc e s .  A study of both 
military and non-military ac tiv it ies  is absolutely necessary  for the 
reader to understand the involvement of the M exican military in the 
affairs of the nation. Non-military functions include ac tiv it ies  like 
military c iv ic -a c t io n  programs, political participation, such as holding 
elected or appointed office in government, and participation in political 
parties , and other non-military a rea s .
At this point the term political should be c lar ified . Anything the 
military does whether non-military or not can generally be c lass if ie d  as 
p o lit ica l .  In this paper, however, the military's functions categorized 
as political a c tiv it ies  are only those sp e c if ica lly  listed as such , and 
these are covered in a section  of the paper entitled Political Involvement.
v
C ollecting data on this sub ject has been extremely difficult and 
frustrating, esp ec ia lly  in the area of non-military a c t iv it ie s .  The 
M exican armed forces are very secretive about their a c t iv i t ie s .  O fficial 
information such as the military archives and other materials is almost 
impossible for the researcher to get a t ,  and interviews with high military 
officers are a lso  nearly impossible to arrange. Source materials such as 
Directorio del Poder Ejecuting Federal and Directorio de Organizmos 
D escentralizados (government directories) are not in stock and the 
M exican  government does not know when they will be published again . 
These directories contain excellen t sources on this su b je c t .  The writer 
has been able to use some of the older ed itions. Collecting data on the 
organization and mission of the armed forces was not too d ifficu lt . Many 
different source materials have been used for this paper, most of which 
are secondary so u rces . B as ica lly  the writer is analyzing data that 
already have been co llec ted , but with a new approach and purpose. The 
sources represent both M exican and American scholarship , with many 
o ffic ia l M exican publications, and both M exican and American periodi­
c a l s .  Since embarking upon this study, it has not been possible to 
conduct research in M exico for a number of reaso n s . But the writer is 
very familiar with M exico , having made numerous trips to the country, 
the information gained on these  trips has helped in writing this paper.
At this point no other research has been conducted on this top ic .
vi
Hopefully, this work partially f i l ls  the gap and makes a contribution to 
the study of M exican militarism.
Chapter I d iscu sse s  the more tech n ica l asp ects  of the armed forces 
to enhance the reader's understanding. Chapter II covers the area of 
military functions in terms of the external and internal ro le s .  Chapter III 
d is cu sse s  the non-military a c t iv it ie s .
Chapter IV is devoted to an analysis  of other Latin American 
arm ies. The purpose of this is to see  where the M exican armed forces 
differs from other Latin American arm ies. The final chapter presents a 
summary and co n clu sio n s, and speculates on the future of the M exican 
armed fo rces .
vii
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ABSTRACT
Unlike other Latin American n atio n s , the M exican armed forces 
have not resorted to a coup d 'etat in the last fifty y e ars , and at the same 
time have maintained a strong influence in the affairs of the nation.
In this th e s is ,  the writer has tried to explain reasons why the 
M exican military has not found it n ecessary  to try to overthrow the 
government.
The procedure used was to co llec t  and analyze data on the M exican 
armed fo rces ,  military, and non-military functions and roles to determine 
reasons for this situation in M exico . The writer experienced great 
difficulty in collecting  data, nev erth eless , in the w riter's opinion a 
sufficient amount of data was obtained.
The result of this research allowed for the presentation of five 
reasons as a possible  explanation for this military situation in M exico . 
These reasons are: (1) the armed forces ' c lo se  relationship with the 
president of M ex ico , (2) their involvement in m ilita ry -c iv ic-ac t io n  
programs, (3) the m ilitary's involvement as an interest group, (4) the 
military philosophy of the Mexican armed fo rce s ,  and (5) the favorable 
economic climate that e x is ts  in M exico .
x
The conclusion of this writer is that these  five reasons explain 
why the M exican military maintains a strong influence in the nation and 
has had no reason to attempt a coup d 'e ta t .
xi
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M exican military has not found it necessary  to try to overthrow the 
government.
The procedure used was to co llec t  and analyze data on the M exican 
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INTRODUCTION
Highlights of M exican Military History
This chapter will attempt to set the stage for the rest of the paper 
by highlighting various asp ects  of M exican military history. The writer 
is aware of the perils of trying to write about the history of any country 
in a paper of this length. The key point to remember is that violence 
became a means for institutional change and control in M exico , thus 
elevating militarism. M exico throughout much of its history has suffered 
from the rule of d icta tors , strongmen (Caudillos) who have held power 
through control of an army.
After the Spanish were firmly entrenched in M exico , the Crown did 
not offer much in the way of protection to the people. This can be shown 
by the fact that there were only three thousand troops in M exico in 
1758. This condition led to the development of the caudillo , which 
developed in the personage of the Hacendado, the J e f e , the local Patron. 
These men assumed responsibility  for the welfare of their people, and by 
organizing protective forces became military figures. The same forces 
could be used to suppress the people as well as protect them. The
*John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America 
(Stanford: Stanford University P r e s s , 1964), p. 18.
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people, being illiterate  and unsophisticated , were esp ec ia lly  impressed 
with these lead ers , and no doubt feared their power.
Early governments were not the most effic ient and honest; although 
the post of viceroy was rarely ever sold , most lower o ff ic ia ls  were 
appointed according to patronage and were frequently incompetent.  ̂ This 
system of governing ex isted  until the late 18th century when the Bourbon 
Reform caused the inauguration of a Creole dominated militia in the New 
World.  ̂ The Creoles (Spanish born in New World) were firmly entrenched 
in officer positions in time for the beginning of the War for Independence.^
In 1810 and 1813, two independence movements led by Father Don 
Miguel Hidalgo and Father Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon, resp ectiv ely , 
both failed for lack  of a sufficiently  armed, d iscip lined , well trained 
army, but in 1821 by an ironical twist of fa te ,  independence was a fa c t .^  
The independence movement was consummated by Agustin de Iturbide, 
who switched his a lleg iance from the Crown, bringing the Creole 
dominated army with him. Aside from his few desirable q u a lit ie s ,  only 
his audacity was seen when he turned on the Constitutional Congress
^American H eritage , Vol. XX, No. 3 ,  April, 1969 , p. 12.
^Lyle N. M cAlister, The "Fuero M ilitar" in New Spain (G ainesville : 
University of Florida P r e s s , 1957), p. 63.
^Henry R. Parkes, A History of Mexico (Cambridge: The Riverside 
P ress ,  1938), p. 107.
^American H eritage, p. 16.
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which gave him authority and declared himself Agustin I , Emperor of 
M ex ico . By this single a c t ,  Iturbide initiated what was to be a standard
r
political technique of M exico: the way to power is  v io le n ce . Iturbide 
has been called  "the precursor of that system of government which 
brought ruin to the country for more than a century. " In 1824, he was 
overthrown, but violence was to continue with over one thousand armed
O
uprisings during the first hundred years of independence. The practice 
of ley fuga (the killing of prisoners on the pretext that they were attempt­
ing to escap e) and the widespread use of the court martial became 
common.  ̂ The b itterness of the struggle for independence laid the 
foundations for a morale that would make violence a necessary  element 
in future p o lit ics  and political technique.
Next to dominate M exico was a true demogogue named Antonio 
Lopez de Santa Anna. He became president of Mexico on eleven different 
o cca s io n s  starting in 1830. Santa Anna was the power in M exico until 
1854, during these  years the budget of the army alone exceeded that of 
the total government revenues more than half the time. From 1823 to
®Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution (New York: Columbia 
University P r e s s , 1933), p. 76.
^Jose V asco n ce lo s , Breve Historia de M exico (M exico: Accion 
Moderna M ercantil, 193 7), p. 3 52 .
O
Edwin Lieuwin, Arms and P olit ics  in Latin America (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 101.
q
Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution, p. 78.
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1845, the total income of the nation was $ 2 9 1 ,2 3 6 ,7 9 6 ,  and in these 
twenty-three years the army had assigned to it $ 3 2 6 ,5 0 6 ,7 1 5 .  During 
this tim e, if the generals were not paid, a revolt became imminent. ^
The period 1854-1872 is known as the Reforma Epoch and is not 
significant to the theme of this paper. After the death of President 
Benito Juarez, Porfirio Diaz made himself the regularly re -e lec ted  
president-dictator of M exico from 1 8 7 7 -1 9 1 0 . Diaz had been one of the 
most prominent liberal generals in the fight against French interlopers 
during the m id -1 8 6 0 's .  His iron rule brought dom estic peace and made 
life easy  and pleasant for the privileged few landowners and a growing 
number of foreign and M exican businessm en. Diaz reigned until 1910 
when, in the early stage of the M exican Revolution, he was forced into 
e x i le .  By using the army to stay in power and using it ru th lessly , Diaz 
had become one of the more su cce ss fu l Latin American dictators by 
replacing instability  and disorganized violence with tyranny and organized 
v io le n c e . * *
When the M exican Revolution of 1910 began, the National Army was 
a most ineffective force . The recruitment of troops consisted of forced
Lieuwin, Arms and P o l i t ic s , p. 103; Wilfred H. C a llco tt ,  
Santa Ana: The Story of an Enigma Who was Once M exico (Norman; 
University of Oklahoma P ress , 1936); Johnson, Military and S o c ie ty , 
p. 50; Parkes, History of M e x ic o , p. 178; Tannenbaum, Peace by 
Revolution, p. 85.
^ F ran k  Tannenbaum, M exico; The Struggle for Peace and Bread 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,. 1950), pp. 8 1 -8 2 .
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enlistm ents of M estizos and Indians. They were inadequately armed, 
underpaid, poorly clothed and housed, and ineptly trained. They had to 
live off the land while their officers lived in luxury. The officer corps 
was recruited strictly  from the middle and upper c l a s s e s .  The army con­
sisted of twenty thousand troops and four thousand officers for a popula­
tion of fourteen million p e o p le .^  True to the tradition established by 
Iturbide, many officers deserted the National Army to align themselves 
with the revolutionist they thought would win. The National Army was 
defeated in 1911, and Porfirio Diaz went into e x i le .
The armies of the revolution were led by four caudillos: Pancho 
V illa , the sem i-litera te  bandit from the north; Emiliano Zapata, the 
campesino leader from Morelos in the south; Pascual Orozco from 
Chihuahua in the north; and Alvaro Obregon, the rancher from Sonora. ^
The fighting started again in 1913 when President Madero ordered 
General Victoriano Huerta to crush a rebellion . Huerto then turned on 
Madero and ousted him. ^  He remained in power for seventeen months 
through the army and was as brutal as D iaz.
In March 1913 Venustiano Carranza formed the Constitutionalist 
Army with General Obregon. With the aid of V illa 's  "army of the north,"
^ Ibld . , pp. 8 0 -8 4  .
^ F r a n c is c o  N aranjo, Diccionario biografico revolucionario (Mexico: 
Imprenta Editorial "C o sm o s ,"  1935).
^Tannenbaum , Peace and Bread, p. 150.
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and Zapata's agrarian army, Huerto was defeated. Opposed to the pro­
grams of Zapata and the aspirations of V illa , Carranza continued the fight 
until his forces under General Obregon defeated V illa . Later Zapata was 
a ssassin a ted  by Carranza fo rce s .  Carranza then became president of 
M exico . When it appeared that Carranza would not relinquish control of 
the presidency, the fighting was resumed by the Obregon forces under 
General Plutarco Elias C alles  and the Governor of Sonora, Adolfo de la 
Huerta. Carranza was soon defeated , and he too was a ssassin a ted  . ^
In 1920 General Alvaro Obregon became president of M ex ico , thus 
starting a tradition of revolutionary generals holding power in M exico 
until 1946. The Carranza reign marked the last time a president of 
M exico  was overthrown. There were attempts under the administrations 
of Generals C alles  and Cardenas during the 1920's and 1 9 3 0 's ,  but all 
fa iled . With the Presidency in the hands of General Obregon, the con­
solidation phase of the revolution began and the beginning of the present 
day M exican government and armed fo rces . Militarism would continue to 
reign in M exico as in the p ast, but it would be of a different color. Under 
Obregon the professionalization of the armed forces began and continues 
to this day. Violence as a means to change and power suffered a swift 
decline after the Revolution. Although the generals and the army were 
the dominant forces in M exico until about 1946, they represented a
15Hudson Strode, Tim eless M exico (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
and Company, 1944), p. 261.
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different type of militarism. They came from the m asses and wanted to 
see M exico move and grow. They were a lso  patriotic and not only con­
cerned with the spoils of victory.
At this point the writer will start to look at involvement of the armed 
forces of M exico  to analyze why they have not resorted to a coup d 'e ta t ,  
and even though they are no longer the dominant elem ent, have found 
their place in the affairs of the nation.
CHAPTER I
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY
The Army
The military of M exico co n sis ts  of an army and a national guard as 
ground fo rces ,  a navy and an air force . This chapter will deal with each 
branch separately . The army and the national guard are supposed to 
defend the nation, but there are differences between the two.
The guard belongs to the s ta te s ,  although congress does have the 
power to regulate them. The president must have the approval of the 
senate to move the guard outside of its own state.'* ’ This chapter will 
not be concerned with the national guard.
The army is a federal institution, professional and permanent. 
Congress has the power to ra is e ,  sustain and regulate the army. The 
president is responsible for deploying the army to meet the needs of the 
nation. The Constitution i ts e l f  does not designate the president of the 
Republic as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces . This position is 
granted him by the Ley Organica del Ejerato of 1926. The Constitution
^Felipe Tena Ramerez, Derecho Constitutional M exicano (Mexico: 
Ed. Porrua, 1955), pp. 3 8 5 -3 9 5 .
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of the Seven Laws of 1836 established the Ministry of War and M arine.^ 
The professionalization and institutionalization of the army began 
under General Obregon when he was president. Obregon brought into the 
regular army a ll the revolutionary generals , saying that " i f  a man ca lls
O
him self a general, he must be o n e ." °  He reopened the Heroico Colegio 
M ilitar at Chapultepec and sent officers abroad to study. General 
Plutarco Elias C a l le s ,  who served a term as president and headed the 
Revolutionary Family until 193 5, tried to develop loyalty for their pro­
fess io n  and their country within the army ranks.^
This job fe ll  to General Joaquin Amaro, a career so ld ier, who 
should receive major credit for professionalizing the army. Amaro 
improved training programs at a ll  le v e ls ,  put the best trained officers in 
the c r it ica l  p osition s. The physical structure of the army was radically  
changed. A b a s ic  literacy  campaign was established and a c iv ic  action 
program started . ^
General Cardenas replaced the Ministry of War and Marine with a 
o
Directorio del Gobierno federal-, 1949 (Mexico: Secretaria  de 
Bienes N acionales e Inopeccion Administrativa, 1950), p. 149; M ex ico : 
Ley Organica Del E jerc ito , Ley Organica De La Armada (Ed. Aheneo, 
1960), pp. 1 1 -1 2 .
i
^Tannenbaum, Peace and Bread, p. 63.
^Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern M exico (Englewood 
C l i f f s ,  New Jersey: P ren tice-H all,  I n c . ,  1969), pp. 1 -1 9 .
5Carleton B e a ls ,  "The Indian Who Sways M exico 's  D e st in y ,"
New York T im es, Part V, December 7, 1930, pp. 7 - 8 .
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D efense Ministry on October 25, 193 7 to demonstrate the defensive 
nature of the armed fo rces . In 1939, the Marine Department was separated 
by law and granted ministerial s ta tu s . The air force was recognized by 
law in 1944 .6
Under the Ministry of National Defense there is a subsecretary 
and an O ficia l Mayor in the chain of command. The O fic ia l Mayor is the 
link between military and civilian  authorities and the general public. He 
is in charge of the Central Recruiting O ffice . The General Staff (estado 
mayor) reports directly to the secretary; they provide him with the 
tech n ica l information required by him to formulate policy. The General 
Staff handles training and organization and instruction within the military. 
The E scu ela  Superior de Guerra and the Heroico Colegio M ilitar are under 
the supervision of the General S taff . The ch ief of the Military Geographic 
S erv ice , which provides mapping and charting service to the army and air
y
force , is responsible to the General S taff .
The Department of Ju s t ice ,  which co n sis ts  of a Supreme Military 
Tribunal, an appellate court; the Attorney General for Military Ju s t ice ,  
the prosecution and evidence gathering branch, and the O ffic ia l
Ramerez, Derecho Constitutional M ex ica n o , p. 3 88; Directorio 
del Gobierno, p. 305 .
7
W illiam P. Tucker, The M exican Government Today (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota P ress , 1957), pp. 193-96 ; Jose M ijares P alencia , 
El Gobierno M exicano (Mexico: Sociedad M exicana de P u b lica c io n es , 
1936), pp. 9 8 -1 0 0 .
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Defenders and military law yers, is the only other department that reports 
directly to the secretary . All other bureaus of the military report through 
the normal chain of command.
A Department of Arms was estab lished  in 1954, combining a ll the 
previously separate bureaus for infantry, artillery , and cavalry. The 
Reserve Bureau was changed to the Rural Defense Bureau. The Bureau for 
Military Education was estab lish ed  to handle literacy among army per­
sonnel and dependents. A General Bureau of Personnel handles all 
military personnel, a c t iv e ,  reserve and retired.®
The General Communications Command provides the administrative 
network for the army. The Bureau of Engineers has control over its own 
units and the military construction program. There is a Bureau of Military 
Transportation and a Bureau of Military Archives. The General Administra­
tion of the Army takes care of planning and operation of the pay system . 
The Bureau of Army Social Se.rvices is in charge of the Savings Fund, the 
Army Bank, and the life insurance program. The Services of Parks, 
Armament Stores and Munitions handles the reception, storage and 
distribution of military munitions. The Bureau of Military Health pro­
vides for medical and sanitary ca re ,  and a lso  supervises the h o sp ita ls ,  
the Escuela Medico M ilitar , the Escuela de Enfermeros and the Escuela"
O




The Bureau of Military Studies was estab lished  in 1925 to send 
military m issions to the United States and Europe to learn the la test  
techniques of military sc ie n c e .  The Department of Military Industries, 
created in 194 7 , is the organization charged with the operation of the 
munitions and arms factories which supply the armed fo rc e s .  It further 
provides research and development work.
The army's schools are quite extensive for the career soldier. The 
Heroica Colegio M ili ta r , which is the military academy, is now located 
in Popotta, D. F .  (Federal District) and offers a three-year program in 
combat arms (infantry, artillery , and cavalry). Courses in the sc ie n ce s  
and humanities are taught. Emphasis is placed on physical conditioning 
and practical application of theory and t a c t i c s .  A complete physical and 
mental examination plus a five hundred peso entrance fee is required for 
a ll  entering s t u d e n t s .^
A survey of the incoming c la s s  of 195 5 showed that only four per 
cent had incomplete secondary schooling. Also an abnormally large per 
cent of students are from the Federal D is tr ic t ,  since education is  st il l  a 
problem in rural a re a s .  And, fin ally , the occupations of the fathers or 
guardians of incoming students were primarily military, shopkeepers,
^Directorio del Gobierno, pp. 154-163 .
^V irgin ia  Prewitt, "The M exican Army, " Foreign A ffairs , Vol. 19 
(April, 1941), p. 613 .
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white co lla r , and manual labor. * 1 *
Other schools include the Escuela Superior de Guerra, founded in 
1932. This is the highest school in the military. It is a three-year 
course open to officers of all se rv ice s .  Military techniques and t a c t i c s ,  
law, and military application of geography are taught with equal emphasis 
on course work and practical application. Entrance requirements depend 
on stage of career development, tes t in g , and ag e .
El Centro de Instruccines de Tefes y O f f ic ia le s , es tab lish ed  in 
1936 as an officer candidate school, provides training to non­
commissioned officers desirous of obtaining commissioned rank.
The Escuela Militar de Applicacion estab lished  in 1932 is a 
mandatory course for a ll  company grade officers and presents b a s ic  
sp ecia lized  instruction in the various arms and services .
Finally , the Escuela Medico Militar (medical school) provides the 
nation with many doctors. Products of th is  school have high professional 
prestige and further service is not limited to military f ie ld s .  ^  There are 
a lso  eight military hospitals throughout the country with a general and an
Javier Romero, Aspectos Psicobiom etricos y s o c ia le s  de una 
muestra de la juventud mexicana (M exico, 1956), pp. 4 7 ,  4 9 ,  52 .
^ P a l e n c i a , El Gobierno M ex ican o , pp. 9 6 -9 7 ;  Prewitt, "M exican 
Army," pp. 6 0 9 -6 2 0 .
I O
Enrique Pena y de la Pena, "La Escuela Medico M ilitar , Una 
obra original de la revolucion m exicana, " Combate (November, 1960).
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isolation hospital in the Federal D is tr ic t .  ^
For military purposes the country is divided into ten military 
regions with headquarters at strategically  located c i t i e s . 1^
The regions are:
1. M exico C ity , D .F .  (Federal District)
2 .  Veracruz, Veracruz
3 .  Merida, Yucatan
4 .  Ix tep ec , Oaxaca
5 . G uadalajara, Ja lisco
6. Tia juana, Baja California
7 . Hermosillo, Sonora
8 .  Torreon, Coahuila
9 .  Monterrey, Nuevo Leon
10. Irapuato, Guanajuato
Every region is commanded by a lieutenant general. The nation is further 
divided into thirty-two military zone commands corresponding to the 
division of the s ta te s .  Each is commanded by a major general. -*-6 
The zone commands are: *
^ C a r lo s  R. Berzunza, "M exico-N ational D e fe n s e ,"  Encyclopedia 
Americana, Vol. 18 (1964), p. 779 .
15Ib id . , pp. 7 7 9 -7 8 0 .
■^Directorio del Gobierno, pp. 1 5 1 -1 5 2 .
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1. M exico C ity , D .F .
2 .  El C ipres, Baja California (Norte)
3 . La Paz, Baja California (Sur)
4 .  Herm osillo, Sonora
5. Chihuahua, Chihuahua
6. Torreon, Coahuila
7. Monterrey, Nuevo Leon
8 . Tampico, Tampaulipas
9 . C uliacan , Sinaloa
10. Durango, Durango
11. Z a ca te ca s ,  Z acatecas
12. San Luis Potosi, San Luis Potosi
13. T ep ic , Nayarit
14. A g u asca lien te s , Aguascalientes
15. G uadalajara, Ja lisco
16. Irapuato, Guanajuato
17. Queretaro, Queretaro
18. Venta Prieta , Hidalgo
19. Tuxpan, Veracruz
2 0 .  Colima, Colima
2 1 .  M orelia, Michoacan
2 2 .  Toluca, M exico
2 3 .  T la x c a la ,  T laxcala
16
2 4 .  Cuernavaca, Morelos
2 5 .  Puebla, Puebla
2 6 .  Veracruz, Veracruz 
2 7. Acapulco, Guerrero
2 8 .  O axaca , Oaxaca
2 9 .  Villaherm osa, Tabasco
3 0 .  Tapachula, Chiapas
31. Merida, Yucatan
32 . Campeche, Campeche
The army is  composed of an infantry d iv ision, an infantry brigade,
a presidential guard brigade, fifty infantry b atta lio n s , twenty-one
cavalry regim ents, a mechanized regiment, three artillery regim ents,
two coast artillery b a tte r ie s ,  three independent artillery b a tte r ies ,  two
combat engineer batta lion s , one signal b atta lion , and one quartermaster
batta lion . This breakdown includes approximately fifty thousand o fficers  
17and men.
Each of the zones has an infantry batta lion . The infantry division 
and the motor-mechanized brigade are stationed in M exico C ity . At 
Puebla, about s ix ty -fiv e  miles e a s t  of M exico C ity , is a mobile strategic  
reserve fo rce , consisting of the 12th Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, six 
cavalry regim ents, both engineer b atta lio n s , and the three artillery
17Tucker, M exican Government Today, p. 194; Berzunza, 
"M exico-N ational D e fe n s e ,"  p. 779.
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b a tte r ies .  ° The remaining units, are integrated within the zones and 
regional commands and the Federal D is tr ic t .
Regular army personnel serve six  year en listm ents. President 
Cardenas estab lished  universal military training, which provides for 
weekly training on Sundays of e igh teen -year-o ld s for a one-year period.19 
Many from this grouping later go into the reserve or regular army.
The Navy
D ireccion General de la Armada, the fleet navy, is  a bureau under 
the Ministry of the Marine. The navy co n s is ts  of eight fr ig a tes , twenty- 
five escort v e s s e l s ,  twenty m inesweepers, a training ship, ten patrol 
v e s s e l s ,  two patrol b o a ts ,  one transport, six  landing cra ft ,  two tugs 
and the Presidential yach t. One marine battalion is stationed in each 
zone. Total strength of the navy is about six  thousand men and o ff ice rs .
The navy is subdivided into departments of Armaments, Administra­
tion , Naval Health, Communications, Personnel, M ateria l, Legal 
A ss is ta n ce , Naval Archives. Eight zones have been estab lished  for the 
deployment of naval forces with four headquarters on each c o a s t .  ^0
The zones are:
18Thomme Clark C a ll ,  The M exican Venture (New York: Oxford 
University P r e s s , 1953), p. 250 .
19 New York T im es, February 5 , 1952 , p. 17; Hispanoamericano,
V ol. 47 (February 22 , 1965), p. 11.
^ B e rz u n z a ,  "M exico-N ational Defense , "  pp . 7 7 9 -7 8 0 .
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1. Tampico, Tamaulipas
2 .  Margarita Island , Baja California
3 . Veracruz, Veracruz
4 .  Guaymas, Sinaloa
5 .  Carmen, Campeche
6 . M anzanillo, Colima
7. Mujeres Island, Quintana Roo
8 .  Acapulco, Guerrero
The Heroica Escuela Naval Militar and the Naval War College are 
located at Anton Lizardo, Veracruz. The naval aviation school is located 
in Veracruz and the sa ilo r 's  school is at M azaltan . ^
The Air Force
The air force is a department of the Defense M inistry. It has two 
d iv isions: the training division handles strategy, t a c t i c s ,  aerial troops, 
training, and lo g is t ic s ;  the administration and operations division con­
s is ts  of shops, storage, armament, munitions and aerial photography.
The air force has five thousand men deployed into four groups plus a 
training group.
There are ten separate squadrons and a paratroop battalion. There 
are over three hundred aircraft in the air force. This includes fifteen 
Vampire je t  fighter-bom bers, 15T-33A dual purpose je t  tra in ers , fighter
^ Directorio del G obierno, pp. 303-3  16.
19
bombers, C -54  and C -5 7  transports, and 30T-28A piston engined fighters. 
The military flying school at Guadalajara includes an aviation mechanics 
sch ool, a parachute training school and a meteorology s c h o o l .^2
Military Budget
The M exican military has managed over the years to keep its size 
at a minimum despite large growth rates in the population, It has the
O O
lowest ratio of soldiers to population in a ll  of Latin America. ° Military
O A
expenditures from 1951-1966  can be seen in Table 1. In terms of 
military aid from the United S ta te s ,  M exicans have received the 
sm allest amount given to any Latin nation since 1950 , amounting to 
about 1 .1  million d o l l a r s .^
Professionalization of the Military 
This process had its beginnings under General Obregon when he 
was War M inister under President Carranza. Prior to World War II ,  the 
M exico military was trained mainly along German military l in e s ,  but 
present day organization and training follow the methods of the United 2
2 2Hispanic American Report (August, 1961), p. 676 .
^ U n ite d  N ations, S ta t is t ica l  Bulletin for Latin America, V ol. 2 
(August, 1965), pp. 3 - 8 .
^ M e x i c o ,  Diario O fic ia l (December 31 , 1 9 5 0 -1 9 6 5 ) .




MILITARY BUDGET FIGURES AS PERCENTAGE 
OF FEDERAL BUDGET
Year Budget Per cent Rank
1951 $ 3 7 6 , 0 5 1 , 0 0 0 12 3
1952 4 5 2 , 4 8 0 , 0 0 0 11 3
1953 5 0 7 , 3 1 6 , 0 0 0 12 3
1954 6 8 3 , 6 1 4 , 0 0 0 14 2
1955 7 1 6 , 9 1 9 , 0 0 0 12 3
1956 8 2 0 , 4 6 5 , 0 0 0 12 5
1957 9 1 2 , 0 1 6 , 0 0 0 12 3
1958 1 , 0 0 9 , 4 8 5 , 0 0 0 12 4
1959 1 , 0 0 8 , 8 6 0 , 0 0 0 10 5
1960 1 , 1 4 9 , 4 9 1 , 0 0 0 11 2
1961 1 , 1 7 4 , 1 7 5 , 0 0 0 10 3
1962 1 , 2 1 7 , 7 8 2 , 0 0 0 9 3
1963 1 , 4 1 8 , 1 0 9 , 0 0 0 12 3
1964 1 , 5 6 1 , 5 2 2 , 0 0 0 9 3
1965 1 , 7 8 9 , 8 5 3 , 0 0 0 5 3
1966 1 , 9 4 0 , 9 5 7 , 0 0 0 4 3
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States military. Since the war, hundreds of Mexican military personnel 
have been trained in the United Sta tes .  Competition to attend United 
States military schools is so fierce that the final decis ion is usually 
made by the President or Secretary of National Defense .   ̂7
Many Mexican officers have attended United States Army Command 
and General Staff College ,  the Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulick, 
Canal Zone, and the nine-month course of the Inter-American Defense 
College at Fort McNarr, Washington, D. C .  Further, United States 
and Mexican military personnel are usually engaged in various exchange 
and visi ting functions , which has all  added to the professionalization 
of the M exican military.
From the rag- ta i l  armies of strongmen (caudillos) like Pancho 
Villa and Emiliano Zapata, the Mexican army has come a long way to 
where it is today. No longer is the army composed mainly of the upper 
c l a s s e s .  The large numbers of soldiers of middle and lower c la s s  back­
grounds tends to confirm that the army represents one of the most 
effect ive channels for upward soc ia l  mobility.  Of these income groups 
the lower middle c la ss  income group showed the greatest preference for *2
O £
Johnson, The Military and Socie ty  in Latin America, p. 70.
2 7Del S .  Perkins,  "Contemporary Latin American Polit ics  and the 
Mili tary"  (unpublished Thes is ,  Air War C o l le g e , 1964),  pp. 4 2 - 4 3 .
9 ftNorman Maynard Smith, "The Role of the Armed Forces in Con­
temporary Mexican Poli t ics"  (unpublished T h e s is ,  University of Florida, 
1966),  pp. 9 0 - 9 1 .
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a military career.
Another reason for this changing pattern in officer recruitment 
besides  social  mobility,  is the fact that increased professionalism has 
driven away indolent upper c l a s s  elements who now frown upon the 
increased responsibi lity and the decreased emphasis on individualism 
and glory. This trend is further reflected by the attempt of the middle 
c l a s s  government to create a sympathetic attitude toward its armed 
fo rces .  Another reason is that emphasis on education has provided 
lower c l a s s  children with educations which enable them to qualify for
o n
entrance to the Military Academy. As a broad general statement,  it 
has been observed that the type who enters the Military Academy would
O I
probably be a su c ce s s  in any chosen endeavor.
There seems to be a lack of unanimity as  to whether soc ia l  b a ck ­
ground is more important or le s s  important to the character of the military 
than other soc ia l  types .
Other Latin American armies are as  highly professionalized as the 23
2 9
2 9Laszlo  Radvanyi,  "What Occupations Would Mexicans C h o o s e , "  
Modern M e x ic o , Vol. 2 (September, 1948),  p.  19.
30 Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 106;
Lyle N. McAlister,  "The M il i ta ry ,"  in Continuity and Change in Latin 
America,  ed. by John J .  Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University P ress ,  
1964),  p. 145.
3 1Theodore Wyckoff,  "The Role of the Military in Contemporary 
Latin American P o l i t i c s , "  Western Polit ical Quarterly, Vol. 12 (September, 
1960),  p. 757.
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Mexican army and draw their officer corps from similar ranks, but their 
professionalization has led to one military takeover after another. The 
writer will probe this point in a later chapter.  So far this professionali ­
zation has not affected the Mexican army in the same way.
CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
This chapter will look at the role of the armed forces which has 
two b as ic  military functions , that i s ,  providing external and internal 
security.  The external function is considered in this sec t ion ,  but the 
main concern is with the internal role of the military.
External Role
The mission of the Mexican armed forces provides that the army be 
organized according to the n e c e s s i t ie s  of geography, international re la ­
t ions ,  interior order and the economic development of the country, and 
they should organize themselves in peace for al l  operations of war.-1
Theoretically the armed forces are supposed to be able to protect 
Mexico from any type of outside aggression ranging from guerrilla 
warfare to nuclear war. They should a lso  be prepared to perform in the
O
event of war by subversion or polit ical warfare.  *5
L̂ey Organica del E je r c i to , p. 12.
^Theodore Wyckoff,  "Communist Military Capabili t ies in Latin 
America: The Spectrum of V io lence ,"  in The Poli t ical -Mil i tary Defense of 
Latin America, e d . by Bruce B. Mason (Tempe: Public Affairs Series No.
5, Bureau of Government Research, Arizona State University,  1963) ,  p. 22.
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The last  nation to have an interest in Mexican territory was France 
in 1867, when Maximilian was defeated. Besides a few United States 
interferences (Veracruz 1914,  General Pershing's expedition 1916), 
Mexico has not had to fear any immediate external threat.  Her land 
forces  are mostly infantry with supporting arms but very limited in 
logis t ica l  support. The navy's time is spent in keeping fishing boats 
outside of M ex ico 's  territorial waters (nine miles) .  The air force is 
extremely small compared to C u ba 's .  The United States has more troops 
at any one installation than the entire Mexican military. In addition to 
their small s i z e ,  the military is spread throughout each of the s ta te s ,  
territories and Federal D is tr ic t ,  which is a good military setup for 
internal security but not for external security.  Even though the military 
is small ,  they have the responsibili ty  of providing for external security.  
The truth of the matter is that at the present time Mexico has no need to 
fear any external at tacks upon them. With the United States to protect 
the hemisphere from outside aggression and the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Agreement (Rio Pact) ,  which protects Latin American nations 
from each other,  as  well as  from non hemispheric nations, Mexico has 
no immediate external dangers.
The chances  of aggression on the part of Mexico are minimal. The 
death and suffering the Revolution caused have been an influence in 3
3
Pan American Union, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (Washington, D . C . :  Pan American Union, 19 61),  p.  4 .
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making Mexico a peaceful  country. As President Diaz Ordaz has said , 
"v io len ce— apart from not solving problems nor helping in any way— 
generates v io le n ce ,  thus creating newer and greater problems."^ Mexico 
has kept its nose out of international a f fa irs .  Except for the Mexican 
government's support of the Allies in World War II and the participation of 
her air force in the war, she has usually taken a non-intervention position. 
Of course the military had favored greater participation in the war effort,  
but President Avila Camacho (a general) overruled th is .^  An example of 
this  typical non-intervention approach was M exico 's  refusal to withdraw 
diplomatic recognition or employ any economic sanctions against  Cuba 
until the threat of nuclear m iss i les  in that country arose in 1962 . In 
mentioning Cuba the reader immediately thinks of Castroite insurgents in 
Mexico;  in fact there is no substantial evidence to indicate any such 
activity in M exico .
In terms of hemispheric disputes,  M exico ,  like other Latin Ameri-
7
can nations,  traditionally has settled any disputes by arbitration. 4
4 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, A Poli t ical Handbook (Mexico: Imprenta 
Nuevo Mundo, 1964),  p.  18.
^J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security , 
1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas P r e s s , 1961),  p. 227 .
D Adolf A. Ber le , Latin American Diplomacy and Reality (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962),  p. 137.
^German Arciniegas,  The State of Latin America (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1952),  p. 353 .
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Speaking of Latin American armies in general,  Eduardo Santos has said:
"It is a distinction of Latin America that peace reigns among its member 
nat ions. Any attempt to start an international war would be devoid of 
cause or even pretext.  And it would be criminal, because it could not 
possibly ref lect  anything other than the self ish desires of a few men 
intent upon making a profit out of the carnage.
The ex is tence  of an external threat,  or the b e l ie f  that one e x is t s  at 
the present time, can only be an argument used by the military for 
maintenance of a powerful military force.  The paucity of the armed forces 
in the face of an attack by a strong nation is a fact of l ife recognized by 
the Mexican government. Why really worry about it with the "co lossus  
of the north" to protect you?
Internal Role
The manner in which the armed forces of Mexico are positioned 
shows as  said before that their prime concern is internal. The fact that 
units are stationed in key places  in each state with highly mobile units 
in the Federal Distr ict shows that for internal security and their use as 
a polit ical force ,  the military setup is ideal.  The armed forces are 
deployed in excel lent  positions if they are ever needed to stop insurrec­
tions or riots in the Capitol and other key c i t ie s  in the country. The
^Eduardo Santos,  "Latin American R e a l i t i e s , "  Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 34 (June, 1956),  p.  252 .
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army could ea s i ly  capture any key installation in any state with the large 
number of infantry battalions they have. The reader will reca l l  Chapter I 
and see by the number of units in the capitol and those at Puebla that in 
c a s e  of any problems arising in the Federal Distr ic t ,  the military can 
move swiftly and in force.  These same units could move just  as  eas i ly  
if a coup was being attempted. For purposes of training, operations, 
lo g i s t i c s ,  and external security this decentralization of offensive 
capabil i t ies  is  contrary to widely accepted principles of military 
s c ie n c e .  Chances are ,  if the setup were changed, many bil lots for 
colonels  and lieutenant colonels and probably a few generals would have 
to be eliminated. This does not appear likely to happen.
Mexico has been without a violent overthrow of its government 
longer than any other Latin American nation. Latin American nations 
have suffered over forty coups since 1930.^ The violence of the revolu­
tion is a thing of the past ,  along with the purges of the 1920 's  and 1 9 3 0 's .  
Incidents are much le s s  frequent but the military st il l  plays a key role 
in maintaining poli t ical stability within the c o u n t r y . ^  The incidents of 
the past have often resulted because of elect ion resu lts ,  but in the 1964 
presidential e le c t io n s ,  for the first time in Mexican history,  no major
^Time, October 3 1, 1969 , p. 33 .
^ U . S .  State Department of Il legal and Unscheduled Changes of 
Heads of State ,  193 0 -1 9 6 5 ,  Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol.  12 
(Spring, 1966),  p.  86 .
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demonstrations or uprisings were reported. 11 Even if no troubles are 
expected the army is always on alert at elect ion time.
Besides preserving order, the military has a watchdog and enforcer 
function for the president of Mexico.  That each state has a military zone 
commander and a large contingent of troops is a constant reminder to any 
governor of the parallel  structure of the government and the armed forces .  
Government ministry agents ,  governors,  and military zone commanders 
render reports on each other through their superiors in the capita l .  By 
control of the legislature through party t i e s ,  and as Commander-in-Chief 
the president can take whatever means he wants to insure Revolutionary 
Family goa ls .  Wherever the Institutional Revolutionary Party (P.R.I)  has 
a weak following among governors and leg is la tors ,  or any one e l s e ,  the
1 9presence of a strong military zone commander insures their a c q u ie sce n ce .
Another use of  the military to preserve polit ical stabili ty has been 
in recent years to dislodge squatters (paracoidistas) from the agrarian 
a reas .  Often this results  in the deaths of peasants and troops. Often 
the circumstances  of these  incidents are secretive as to the facts 
involved. A famous c a s e  is Kuben Jaramillo and his family who were *19
^ Hispanic American Report, Vol. 17 (October,  1964),  p. 688;
Martin C. Needier,  "Changing the Guard in M e x i c o , "  Current History,
Vol. 4 8 ,  January, 1965,  p. 30
19 John J .  Johnson, "The Emergence of the Middle S e c to r s , "  in 
Pol it ical Change in Latin America, ed. by John J.  Johnson (Stanford:
Stanford University P r e s s , 1958),  p.  135.
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found dead on May 23 , 1962. Jaramillo was a peasant agrarian leader 
from Morelos for twenty years .  He was a long time supporter of Zapata. 
One of his daughters escaped arrest and fled to the home of ex-Pres ident 
Cardenas, and claimed that a Captain Jose Martinez and some fifty 
troops had taken her father from his house and had then killed him in the 
tradition of ley fuga . A total of five people were found dead. Each corpse 
had a "coup de grace"  .45  caliber bullet in it; in each of the five bodies 
was a lso  a handful of Thompson submachine gun s lugs .  ^  An anti­
government magazine (Politica) concluded that the story had been sup­
pressed that Captain Martinez had been put in a military prison, then 
released and transferred .1  ̂ Further speculation diminished when the 
bullet-ridden bodies of Captain Martinez and the accused informer were 
found. This suggested the possib il ity of government subterfuge to appease 
the campesinos while the true a s s a s s i n  remained f r e e . 1^
Another incident occurred in September, 1961, when hungry 
campesinos attacked an army post.  The army killed a hundred campesinos 
and wounded hundreds more, and a thousand were ja i led .  Acapulco, 
Mexico experienced an incident when eleven thousand squatters were
^ Jo h n  G e ra ss i ,  The Great Fear in Latin America (London: Collier 
Books, C o l l ie r -M acm il lan , L td . ,  1969),  p. 107.
^ Hispanic American Report, Vol. 15 (July, 1962),  pp. 3 9 7 - 3 9 8 .
^ Hispanic American Report, Vol. 15 (August, 1962) ,  pp. 4 9 3 - 4 9 4 .
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forced to move; nine were shot in this encounter.  ^  Federal troops were 
a lso  used to move squatters in Tlaxcala east  of Mexico City.  In 
September, 1961 in campesino uprisings fifty-two were ki lled, one 
hundred wounded and five hundred arrests by federal troops in what the
government called a nationwide communist attempt to start a campesino 
17upris ing. x
The magazine Politica felt  the use of the military prior to a visit  
by President Kennedy in 1962.  Two army generals ,  acting "on orders 
from a b o v e , " broke into the o f f ice ,  confiscated the plates for the forth­
coming publication and jailed key personnel.  The purpose was to search 
for anti-United States propaganda during the stay of the American
President. After a protest by the editor to President M ateos ,  the captives
1 Rwere released by the military chief of the Presidential Guard. 1
The military are even involved in supporting c iv il  police in protect­
ing touris ts .  They a lso  have the function of suppressing banditry. And 
recently they have deployed large troop elements to destroy and control 
the traffic of marijuana. Both these functions are part of the military- 
c iv ic  action program besides  being military functions , so they are pre­
sented in two different chapters.
1 R
G e ra s s i ,  The Great F e a r , p. 104.
^ U . S .  News & World Report, May 2,  1966,  p. 50.
^ Hispanic American Report, Vol. 15 (September, 1962),  pp. 588-
589.
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Federal troops fired on rioters protesting the installation of the 
mayor of Valladolid, Y u c a t a n . ^  Leftists guerrillas attacked the military 
garrison at Ciudad, Madero on September 23 ,  1965. The battle resulted 
in the death of the commanding off icer ,  five sold iers ,  eight guerrillas 
and three c iv i l ian s .  This had been the sixth such attack in the past 
twenty months. Within a day, three hundred troops and four jet fighters
o n
were on the sc e n e ,  under the command of a general.  u Army troops were 
used to patrol the streets  of Merida, Yucatan because of e lect ion unrest.  
Many people were not pleased with the P .R . I .  victory in local e lect ions .2 * 
The most dramatic examples of the army's role as a mechanism for 
internal control have occurred in more recent ye ars .  The armed forces 
have been used to handle student uprising. The National Polytechnic 
Institute was patrolled for two years (in 1956-1957) by federal t r o o p s . * 22 
The army took control of the state of Sonora to crack down on student 
v io lence .  That same year paratroopers occupied the University of 
M o re l ia . 22
The army has invaded several campuses to stop the students from
•^Latin American T im es , July 12, 1965, p. 3 .
2®Ibid., October 10,  1965,  pp. 1 -2 .
^ New York T im es , November 24 ,  1969, p. 13,  November 25 , 1969 ,
p. 5.
22A. W. Bork, "Mexico  — 1 9 6 0 , "  Arizona Quarterly, Vol. 16 (Winter, 
1960),  p. 305 .
22U . S .  News & World Report, June 5,  1967, p. 92 .
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demonstrating. The students staged a strike on August 27 ,  1968, protest­
ing the violation of the constitution giving the University of Mexico 
autonomy. The government claimed a communist conspiracy as a pretext 
to use troops. The trouble actually started on July 26, 1968, when 
students carried banners proclaiming slogans like "Death to the Ape Diaz 
Ordaz,"  many shouted the names of their chief enemies:  General Garcia 
Barragan, Minister of Defense; General Cueto Ramierz, Police Chief of 
the Federal Distr ict;  General Corona del Rosal,  Chief Executive of the
Federal District;  and Luis Echeverria,  the Minister of the Interior who
2 8will  be the next President of M exico .  Federal troops and police were 
used to put down students.  In the course of the rioting, troops killed 
an estimated two hundred people and injured many more. 26 Later 
President Ordaz said the use of troops was to maintain "internal 
security.  "22 There seems to be some controversy over who ordered the 
use of troops. Did the Minister of Defense act on a petition from the 
mayor or the Minister of Interior or from the president? Some will say 
the military acted on its own, others say the president ordered the use of
24 G. M. Bergman, " F la g s ,  Tanks and Students ,"  The Nation, 
September 30 ,  1968,  p. 208.
O r
Ann Fremantle,  "Students in Revolt and Now M e x ic o , '  Common­
weal , October 11,  1968,  p. 47 .
^ New York T im es , October 3 , 1969, p. 10.
^2john W omack, J r . ,  "Unfreedom in M e x ic o , "  The New Republic , 
October 12, 1968,  p. 27.
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2 8troops. This point seems to be a problem, the writer has not been able 
to get at the heart of this controversy. The documentation is not av a i l ­
ab le .  If President Ordaz ordered in the troops then at least  we would 
know that the army acted in an official  capacity .  President Diaz Ordaz 
claimed full responsibi lity for repression of all  student opposit ion.
But this s t il l  does not d isc lose  who gave the order to use federal troops.
If they acted on their own or by a request from some other off ic ia l ,  this 
would present some interesting p o s s ib i l i t ie s .  Does the military have the 
authority to decide for i tse l f  in situations of this kind whether they should 
get involved? Does the president leave the decis ion to them or do they 
merely act on their own initiative and power? If they followed the orders 
of another off icer ,  there is a possibili ty that President Ordaz is not the 
family head and that someone e ls e  i s .  The writer doubts he can get at 
the bottom of this controversy, but the reader can see that if any of the 
last  three possib i l i t ies  are true, then there could be few limits to the 
power of the armed forces .
There are other incidents and situations that can be cited that 
demonstrate the armed forces '  military role in the internal affairs of 
M ex ico ,  some are too minor to present and others difficult to document. 
Today the evict ion of squatters and control of c ivil  disturbances and drug *2
2^The New Republic , October 12, 1968, p. 29; T im e, September 27, 
1968,  p. 33.
2 ^New York Times, October 3 , 1969 , , p. 10.
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traffic remain the military's most conspicuous activity .
It is not the purpose of this chapter to moralize over the armed 
forces '  internal military role.  What has been presented is to show the 
involvement and power of the armed forces in their military role in the 
internal affairs of the nation. This involvement and power in their military 
role is one reason why they have not taken over the government. The 
reader can see  that when the military has to react they can and will do so .  
The orders of the president will be carried out. If violence is required the 
armed forces will  not hes itate to use these t a c t i c s .  The military has 
developed a strong bond of loyalty to the president. The military favors 
a strong central figure like the president,  it makes their job easy  to do. 
The president in turn relies  on the armed forces for support, and when 
necessary  to do the types of jobs present in this chapter.  Obviously 
the "Revolution" is not complete.  Mexico has many ills that have to be 
cured, and as the chapter has revealed, the military will get involved.
CHAPTER III
NON-MILITARY FUNCTIONS AND ROLES
This chapter will  d iscuss  the non-military functions and roles of 
the armed forces .  These functions are composed of two categories:  
mil itary-civ ic  action programs and political involvement.
M il i tary-Civ ic  Action Programs and Involvement 
The purpose of mil itary-civ ic  action programs is to extend to vast 
sectors of the population the government's help, espec ia l ly  in the field of 
soc ia l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  through the military organization of the nation. It is 
based on the premise that the use of military means to accomplish pro­
grams of economic and soc ia l  welfare will awaken in the benefited popu­
lation trust and sympathy toward the government and the armed forces .  
These programs are developed without affecting the military ef f ic iency of 
the armed institutions or compromising their principal function. *
There are two b as ic  reasons for the development of these c iv ic  
action programs. One is the development of the concept that the military 
in Latin America is here to stay; therefore the military's organizational,
■''Smith, "Role of the Armed F o r c e s , "  p. 77.
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lo g is t i c ,  and technica l  capabil i t ies  should be used in a developmental 
ro le .  The second reason is the appearance of armed guerrilla groups 
claiming to be fighting for national l iberation. In the area of guerrilla 
confl ic t ,  the mil itary-civ ic  program is to remove the causes  for a 
revolutionary struggle fermented by the pol i t ica l ,  soc ia l  and economic 
discontent of the people.  In the event of fighting, mil itary-civ ic  action 
should insure that the armed forces of the legitimate government have
O
the support of the people.  If the programs can eliminate the s o c io ­
economic c a u s e s ,  then the guerrilla has no b as is  for support and recruit­
ment from the vi l lages  and towns. Mexico discovered early the military 
value of having labor unions and agrarian communities in the aid of 
government fo rces ,  because in the "Escobar and the De La Huerta"
rebel l ions , the rebels found they could only physically  control the land
3
and not the people.  The threat of Castroite or Communist guerrilla
warfare is at best  minimal for Mexico as  compared with other Latin
4
American countries.
President Cal les  began this program in the twenties through his 
Secretary of War, General Amaro. Over the years the military has 2
2Ibid. , p. 78.
°Tannenbaum, Peace and Bread, p. 98 .
^ U . S . ,  Senate,  Committee of Foreign Relations,  Subcommittee 
Hearings on American Republic Affairs, 90th Cong. , 2d s e s s .  , 1968 
(Washington, D . C . :  Government Printing O f f i c e , January 15, 1968),  
p . 29 .
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increased its involvement, the budget of the military has used as  high as  
sixty per cent of all  funds on these programs. Most of the projects have 
been oriented toward engineering and construction.^
In 1961,  for example, the military completed repairs on 580 schools .  
The next year saw the completion of repairs on 320 sch o o ls .^  This pro­
gram of aid to public education is a strong point of the programs. Since 
the il l iteracy rate is st il l  high in Mexico (about 3 4 . 6  per cent),  the 
military works with the Ministry of Education to provide education pro- 
grams not only for recruits but the families of military personnel.  The 
military a lso  helps teach reading and writing and other b as ic  skil ls  to 
the rural populace. In 19 60 ,  3 6 ,053  military personnel and their 
dependents were taught to read and write,  the next few years saw the
O
figures 3 4 ,4 6 5  and 3 1 ,0 9 9  respect ively .
The military has participated to a great extent in public health work, 
the anti-malaria campaign of the late 1950 's  is a good example. In 1957, 
2 5 ,0 0 0  people were dying annually from malaria,  by 1960 this figure had
^Hispanoamericano, Vol. 47 (February 22 , 1965),  p. 10; Hispano- 
americano, Vol. 49 (February 28 ,  196 6), p. 4 .
0
M exico ,  Memorias de la Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional 
(Mexico: Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional,  1961),  p. 27 .
^United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 19 64 (New York: United 
Nations, 1965),  p.  76.
^Mexico, Informe gue Rinde al H. Congresso de la Union (Mexico: 
Secretaria de Gobsrnacion, 1961),  p. 2 1 .
39
g
been reduced to zero. Military medical off icers stepped in and offered 
their help when, in 1965,  the civil ian doctors went on strike. ^  It is the 
job of the army medical corps to a s s i s t  rural areas who are not properly
c
served by trained doctors and hospita ls .
The military has aided the agricultural sector as  w ell .  In 19 61 and 
1963 to help a reforestation program the army planted over two million 
t r e e s .  ^  In 19 62 the army captured and turned over ninety-seven cattle 
rustlers to c ivil  police with quite a few head of cattle being returned to 
their owners. Besides th is ,  the military has a s s i s te d  in an anti-hoof 
and mouth disease  campaign to help ranchers.  ^
The military has helped fight forest fires whenever needed. In 
1962 armed forces  units fought one hundred forty-two forest fires as  well
I Q
a s  twelve urban f i res .  The military frequently aids in areas hit by 
natural d is a s te rs .  Included in this area are flood and earthquake rel ie f  
operations. The military was named the coordinating agency in a 
disaster  relief emergency plan which was formulated in 1966 at the
g
John C. Dreier,  The Alliance for Progress,  Problems and Per­
spectives (Baltimore: John Hopkins P r e s s , 1962),  p. 112.
^ Latin American T im es , August 3 0 ,  1965, p.  3.
Memorias de la Secretaria de la Defensa N acional , 1961, p. 27; 
Hispanoamericano, Vol. 47 (February 22 , 1965),  p. 10.
^ M e m o r ia s ,  1962 , p. 26 .
13 Ib id . , p . 28 .
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national l e v e l . ^
One of the most vigorous of these c iv ic -a c t io n  programs is in the 
area of narcotics  traffic and smuggling. In 1963 , military engineers 
destroyed five hundred twenty-one hectares of poppy and marijuana in 
the states  of A g uasca l ien tes , Baja ,  California,  Durango, H al isco ,  
M ichoacan,  Nayarit ,  Sinaloa and S o n o r a . * ^ The Mexican army has over 
nine thousand troops engaged in this activity alone at the present time. 
They work in coordination with United States customs.  The United States 
and Mexico have signed a treaty to mutually work out this problem. ^
To date the results of this program have been quite su ccess fu l  in cutting 
off most of the supply coming from M exico .
There is another activity the military has helped in, that of 
Mexicanizing the Indian. By bringing the Indian into the military service 
and cutting his hairpiece ,  teaching him to read and write,  and dressing 
him in the same fashion as his compatriots who come from various sectors 
of the country, familiarizing him with bas ic  mechanical d e v ic e s ,  and 
training him through c i t izenship  inst il ls in him a sense  of nation and the 
patriotism so vital to a soldier ,  the recruit is changed from an Indian 
into a M exican .  Skil ls  may be acquired that will be of future economic
^ Hispanoamericano, Vol. 49 (March 21 ,  1966),  pp. 13 -1 4 .
* 5M em orias , 1963,  p. 27.
16 U . S ,  News & World Report, March 23 ,  1970, p. 38 .
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value.  An army promotion, for instance,  might provide the recruit with
his first sense of the possibili ty of upward soc ia l  mobility. Instead of
the local or regional values which he p o s se ss e d ,  the individual might
17acquire nation-oriented views for the first time.
The military is often called upon in an emergency as the following 
example indicates .  When the Compania Mexicana de Aviacion went on 
str ike ,  the air force flew 3 60 flights between Mexico City and Merida, 
Yucatan; Villahermosa, Tabasco;  Tuxtla,  Gutierrez and Tapachula,
Chiapas; Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche, and Cozumel, Quintana Roo, 
carrying 4 ,2 9 4  passengers ,  13 ,809  kilograms of mail and 5 7 ,2 3 8  k i lo -
I O
grams of freight. The military a lso  has a police function of maintain­
ing law and order in all  rural areas of the country. The military further 
a s s i s t s  c iv il  authorities in patrolling highways during peak vacation 
seasons and at tourist centers .
This involvement in mil itary-civ ic  action programs is an important 
area to this paper. By this involvement the army is kept quite busy with 
a c t iv i t i e s ,  and a sense of aiding the nation is instilled in the military.
The military, through these programs extends its influence in the operation 
of the nation. 17
17 Lyle N. McAlister,  "C iv i l -M il i tary  Relations in Latin America," 
Journal of Inter-American S tu d ie s , Vol. 3 (July, 1961),  pp. 3 4 1 -3 4 3 .
^ M em orias , 1963,  p. 28.
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Political Involvement
The purpose of this sect ion is to present other types of involvement 
of the Mexican military, to show part of the reason why the military is 
peaceful and influential.
The writer will look at some of the ac t iv i t ies  in which the military 
engages in that are political in nature— activ it ies  that would be con­
sidered roles of c iv i l ia n s ,  not military personnel.  Polit ical act iv i t ies  
would include areas such as elected or appointed governmental offices 
held, P . R . I .  act iv i ty ,  and prestige posit ions.  Due to the surreptitious 
nature of the Mexican military, it was extremely difficult to co l lec t  data 
on military ac t iv i t ies  of this type. At the time of this writing the writer 
is s t i l l  in the process of collect ing data along these l in e s .
In Mexico there is a strong military tradition which prompts the 
government to inform the people,  in a variety of ways, of its ideas on the 
role of the military. In school books, the children are taught of the 
various Mexican military heroes,  e sp ec ia l ly  of los ninos heroes at 
Chapultepec, who patriotically defended the honor of M exico .  In about 
third grade the children are taught that the Mexican army is the guarantee
* 9 Paula Galic ia  Cipres ,  Mi Libro de segundo ano (Mexico:
Comision Nacional de los libros de texto Gratuitos , 1960) ,  p. 176.
(Los ninos heroes were the cadets of the military college who fought to 
the death against  General Scott in the Mexican-United States war.)
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o n
of security,  p e a ce ,  order and liberty for the nation.
On one Army Day (dia del soldado), President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 
went back into Revolutionary history to tie the army to the people and 
placed emphasis on the army's mission when he proclaimed:
Their eminently popular origin and their Revolutionary tradition 
binds them permanently to watch over the independence of the 
nation, to safeguard our institutions and to maintain the libert ies 
of the Mexican people because it was the people,  converted into 
the Revolutionary Army who fought resolutely to win them. . . .
The Mexican Army, b a s ic  institution of our democratic regime, is 
the permanent sentinel of the countersign of 1917: the General 
Constitution of the Republic . ^
The importance of this origin of the army is the key to the military 
role in contemporary a f fa irs .  Under Porfirio Diaz the army off icer corps 
came from the ranks of the upper and middle c l a s s ,  who were aligned 
with the traditional conservative forces  of the church and landowners.  
After the Revolution the office corps was replaced by revolutionary 
off icers from the m asses  who desired s o c ia l ,  economic, and polit ical 
reforms. From this group came the generals and officers who were 
intimately involved in the polit ical p ro ces s ,  starting with the drafting 
of the Constitution of 1917.
Generals Carranza, Obregon, C a l l e s ,  and Cardenas were main 
military figures to gain the presidency, with many le s s e r  off icers filling 2
2 0Carmen Dominquez Aguirre and Enriqueta Leon Gonzales ,  Mi libro 
de Tercer ano (Mexico: Comision Nacional de los Libros de texto 
Gratuitos,  1960),  p. 47 .
 ̂^Hispanoamericano, Vol. 49 (February 28 ,  1966),  p.  4 .
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government posts in executive and legis la t ive posit ions. One result is 
that the army has never defected in favor of traditional conservative 
elements,  as have other Latin American armies.  So it is not a question 
of the military's intervening in poli tics  because they have always been 
considered a part of the process .  When the military was made a sector  
of the P . R . I .  , and polit ic ians later questioned President Cardenas about 
th is ,  his reply was that,  "we did not put the army in po l i t ics .  It was 
already there.  . . . We did well  to reduce its influence to one vote in 
f o u r . " 22
The military is engaged in polit ical activity not to the extent that 
they once were,  but is nevertheless ,  a vo ice .  Since 1940, their 
overall  power has been reduced. The civilian has stepped into the 
polit ical spotlight and the military has moved into the background.
Prior to 1940, they had almost complete control.  It has been through 
the efforts of past presidents of Mexico who were generals themselves,  
that the dominant power of the military in the nation has been reduced.
To go back to 1956,  it was found that s ix teen per cent of all  state
governorships, twenty per cent of all  senate s e a t s ,  s ix  per cent of all
23chamber of deputy se a ts  were held by men with military t i t l e s .  In
22William C.  Townsend, Lazaro Cardenas Mexican Democrat 
(Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1952),  p. 116.
9 0
John J .  Johnson, "The Soldier as Cit izen and Bureaucrat,"  in 
Latin American Politics , e d . by Robert D. Tomasek (Garden City,  New 
York: Doubleday and Company, I n c . ,  1966),  p. 109.
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1958, there were eight governors (twenty-four per cent of the total) ,  and
ten deputies (six per cent of the total of a smaller chamber of deputies) ,
who were military m e n . ^  In 1966, nine per cent of the governorships,
fif teen per cent of the senate s e a t s ,  six  per cent of the deputy seats  were
o s
held by military men.
As of January 1969, percentage of governorships, senate and 
chamber of deputy se a ts  remains constant with those of 19 6 6 . At the 
present time it is too early to te l l  what the new percentages will be until 
after the e le c t io n s .  In presidential c ab in e ts ,  military men range about 
two to four seats  depending on who is president at the time. At the 
present time both the Chief  of Police of the Federal District  and the 
Chief of  Police of the Judicial Police (under Attorney General) are army 
generals .  The present Assistant  Secretary of Public Works is an army 
o f f i c e r . S e n a t e  standing committee figures for 1962, show that of 
sixty-two standing committees,  the military was on twenty-seven.  They 
held memberships on seven of the eleven specia l  commissions.  In these 
seventy-three bodies the military had fifty per cent or higher
24 M exico ,  Camara de Senadores,  Directorio,  XLVI Legis la ture , 
1958-1961 (Camara de Senadores,  1964).
^^Ib id . , XLVI Legislature , 196 4 -1 9 6 7 .
^ M a r v in  Alisky, Who's  Who in Mexican Government (Tempe, 
Arizona: Tempe Daily News, January, 1969).
 ̂7Ib id . , pp. 14, 21 ,  35 .
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representation on the following: national defense ,  first and second com­
mittees;  agriculture development, customs, military, ju s t i c e ,  mater ia ls ,  
military health and the instruction committee to the second section of 
the grand jury. In the Chamber of Deputies that same year,  military men 
sat on eighteen of the eighty-eight committees ,  holding majorities on the 
first and second national defense committees ,  military ju s t i c e ,  marine, 
mater ia ls ,  health and military health c o m m i t t e e s .^
Since the P . R . I .  controls al l  e lect ions  in Mexico and is composed 
of agrarian and labor sectors and the popular sector  which includes the 
armed fo rces ,  the se lect ion of military officers is not acc identa l ,  and the 
opportunity for them to affect  decision making on the state and national 
level is c o n s i d e r a b l e . ^  The military has a long asso c ia t ion  with the 
o ff ic ia l  party and has earned their place along with agrarian and labor 
forces for a voice in the decision making p r o c e s s . ^
Since the founding of the off ic ia l  party P . R . I .  (1929) ,  military men 
have held the off ice of president for about 29 y e a rs ,  and ten of the last  
seventeen P . R . I .  presidents have been military m e n . ^  Since 1946, the
O O
“ M exico ,  Secretaria del Patrimonio Nacional,  Directorio del 
Poder Legislat ivo (Secretaria del Patrimonio Nacional,  1962).
29 johnson, "The Soldier as C i t iz e n , "  p.  113.
o nMartin C . Needier,  "The Poli t ical Development of M e x ic o , "  
American Poli t ical Science Review, Vol. 55 (June, 1961),  p.  309 .
^ U . S .  News & World Report, January 24 ,  1966, p. 58.
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off ice was occupied in su ccess ion  by Generals Rodolfo Sanchez Tabooda,
1946-1953 ;  Gabriel Leyna Velazquez, 1953-1957 ;  Agustin Olachea Aviles,
1957-1958 ;  and Alfonso Corona del Rosal,  1 9 5 8 -1965 .  There has even
been speculation that there is an unwritten agreement between the army
32and the party concerning P . R . I .  leadership.
The off ic ia l  party machinery decides who will run and, therefore,
be elected to federal posit ions.  In the present distribution of governors,
senators and deputies ,  including the a l ternates ,  the majority of states
3 3have at leas t  one military man in one or another of these posit ions.  
Military men are involved in the party as  committeemen and party workers. 
In the coming e lect ions  this year,  the writer has discovered so far that 
six candidates for the Mexican senate and four candidates for the 
Chamber of Deputies are military men. Even the opposition parties run 
military men as candidates.  The Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolu­
tion ( P .A .R .M . ) ,  for instance,  has one senate and nineteen deputy and 
alternate candidates running who are military m e n . ^  In Mexico there 
are a few military people who are active in opposition c i r c l e s ,  but are 
not powerful enough to gain much influence in government. A good 
example is General Heriberto J a r a , a revolutionary general,  who over 3
3 2 Brandenburg, Making of Modern M e x ic o , p. 101.
^ Directorio del Poder L e g is la t iv o .
^ P e r s o n a l  letter from American Military Attache, Embassy of the 
United States of America, Mexico City,  June 15, 1970.
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the years has led leftist  opposition causes  and groups. He has always 
been an outspoken crit ic  of the government .35 The point here is that 
even though General Jara and a few other military men might be in the 
opposition, they are involved in pol i t ics .
The military has a voice in the se lect ion of the President of M exico .  
It has been said that "no one can be elected or keep office unless  he is 
acceptable  to the military. "3 6 Another writer has weakened this by saying 
that the president will avoid offending the military in choosing his su c­
c e s s o r .  3 7 The armed forces has the duty of handling and guarding ballots  
in presidential e le c t io n s ,  to insure their safekeeping!
There seems to be a lack of agreement on the exact  selection method 
of "El Tapado" (the hidden one),  but many writers agree that the Secretary 
of National Defense is one of the small inner circle  to be consulted.36 
The president,  in se lect ing his su cce ssor  and in making other d e c is io n s ,
^ New York T im es , April 5,  1964, p. 27.
^ F r a n k  Tannenbaum, "Considerations for the Latin American 
P o l i c y , "  in The Liberal Papers , e d . by James R. Roosevelt (Chicago: 
Quandrangle Books, I n c . ,  1962), p. 281 .
3 7Ward M. Morton, "The Mexican Political Establishment," in 
The Carribean Mexico Today, ed. by A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press , 1964),  p. 21.
O o
Brandenburg, Making Modern M e x ic o , pp. 4 ,  145; Robert E. 
Scott ,  "Mexico:  The Established Revolution,"  in Polit ical Culture and 
Polit ical Development, ed. by Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton:
Princeton University Press ,  1965),  p. 383; Hispanic American Report, 
Vol. 16 (July, 1963),  p. 429 .
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will  try to get a consensus from al l  sectors of the party and society ; from 
this view the military can be seen as an interest group exerting its 
influence on the poli t ical scen e .
Over the years military zone commanders have influenced state
O Q
poli t ics and often overshadowed state governors in power. 3 Military 
zone commanders have used their post as a take-o f f  to enter political 
o f f ice .  Military zone commanders are normally consulted by the presi ­
dent or party o ff ic ia ls  as  to the se lect ion of P . R . I .  candidates in that 
40a r e a .
As appointed governmental posit ions ,  zone commanders are 
important positions in that they have a c c e s s  to patronage, public monies,  
resulting in economic and polit ical power. The se lect ion of these com­
manders, in conjunction with the Secretary of D efense ,  can show who is 
in presidential favor and on his way up the political hierarchy.4  ̂ Some­
times assignments to a military region or zone command in a rich state 
can pacify a particular general who has great political ambitions.
There are other prestige and polit ical positions for military men: 
Chief of Presidential Guard Unit, head of one of the military schools;  
command of the large military units within the federal district;  plus
3 9Tucker,  Mexican Government Today, p. 193.
“̂ Brandenburg, Making of Modern M e x ic o , p. 150.
 ̂~4 b i d . , p.  149; Hubert Herring, "Mexico Today,"  Current History, 
Vol. 3 2 ,  April, 1957,  p.  225 .
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certain Ambassadorships and attache posit ions.
Some senior off icers get involved in several different non-military 
ac t iv i t ies  over their careers .  Two good examples are Generals Agustin 
Olachea and Gabriel Leyva Velazquez. General Olachea has been 
governor of both the states  of Baja California Sur and Baja California 
Norte,  besides  serving as  the president of the P . R . I .  General Olachea 
was a lso  the Secretary of Defense in 19 5 8 -1 9 6 4 .  General Velazquez 
has interlaced army assignments with appointments as  head of the 
National Peasant  Federation (Confederacion Nacional Campesino or 
C . N . C . )  and president of the P . R . I .  , and he has a lso  served as a 
senator and later as governor of the state of Sinaloa.  ^
There is a growing trend for military men to go into b u s in e s s .  To 
l is t  spec if ic  examples is almost impossible to document because these 
military men do not care to have their outside ac t iv i t ies  scrutinized. It 
appears that one way the c ivil ians have been able to help keep the 
military loyal is by allowing for fa c i l i t ie s  for military leaders to become 
businessmen.  By doing this these  men become sidetracked from the 
poli t ical arena to their business  i n t e r e s t s . ^  It is quite b a s ic  informa­
tion in Mexico that most high ranking off icers and civil ian authorities
^ M a r v in  Alisky, The Governors of Mexico (El Paso ,  Texas:  Texas 
Western P r e s s , 1965),  p. 9.
^ U . S .  News & World Report, January 24 ,  1966, p. 59; Pablo 
Gonzalez Casonova,  La Democracia en Mexico Ediciones Era S a , 1969, 
pp. 5 0 - 5 3 .
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obtain much wealth from the a c c e ss ib i l i ty  in the system their jobs offer. 
Polit ical off ices in Mexico are one term affairs and it appears that for 
many poli ticians this is enough time for any one person to acquire wealth. 
With the economic prosperity that Mexico has been experiencing, there 
are ample opportunities for these men to take advantage. The writer 
realizes  the pitfalls of such statements without documentation, but it has 
been the writer's experience in dealing and talking with many Mexicans 
that these statements contain much truth.
Senior officers can and do receive positions that are very lucrative. 
Under Article Twelve of the transitory section of the Constitution, as 
another example, provides priority to revolutionists in the acquisit ion of 
lands covered in the agrarian reform sect ion .  Further there is a pro­
vis ion for officers to receive a disposicion by which they may continue 
to receive full pay and accrue time for longevity and retirement purposes
while holding another full-time position with either the government or
, 44private industry.
Many highly trained military men are used in non-military functions 
because of their competence and skil l  in various f ie lds .  The average 
Mexican officer can receive as much as ten to twelve years of various 
types of training. The officer corps represents one of the most highly 
educated groups in the country.
“̂ Jo h n s o n ,  The Military and Society in Latin America, p. 132.
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At this point the writer would like to present a prime example of a 
military man, General Alfonso Corona del Rosal,  who has combined a 
career in the service ,  party and in public affa irs .  After being graduated 
from the National Military College,  he served as  a cavalry off icer ,  
getting leaves of absence to obtain degrees in biology and in law. 
Returning to active duty, he became a professor of law at the military 
co l le g e .  He then ran for Congress and served as a federal deputy, and 
later as  a Senator from his home state of Hidalgo. He then took a 
position combining military and civilian duties as  manager of the 
National Army and Navy Bank. Later he served as Governor of Hidalgo, 
and then moved to the Presidency of P . R . I .  national executive committee.  
In 1964 he was appointed Secretary of National Patrimony.^5 He is now 
chief  executive of the Federal Distr ic t .
The military over the years has supported the president, the party 
and the government, and in return for this support they have not been and 
cannot be overlooked in the affairs of the nation. They are very much 
involved polit ical ly by all  of their a c t iv i t i e s ,  whether these act iv i t ies  
are for the direct benefit  of the nation or for personal reasons .  It is this 
involvement that has made it unnecessary for the military to stage a 
coup d 'e ta t ,  and at the same time this involvement has manifested it sel f  
in the governing of the nation.
^^Alisky, The Governors of M e x ic o , p. 8.
CHAPTER IV
LATIN AMERICAN ARMIES
For the reader to fully understand how the Mexican military has 
involved it sel f  in the affairs of the country, a survey of the armies of 
Latin America is n eces sa ry .  The writer is not trying to develop a model 
for future behavior of Latin American armies by comparing them with 
M e x ic o ’s ,  this cannot be done because each Latin American nation is 
different,  much more than the average American may be l ie v e .  The writer 
does not want to give the reader the impression that all Latin American 
nations suffer from the adverse ef fec ts  of militarism. This is obviously 
not true. There are countries like Chile and Costa Rica that are very 
stable in this s e n s e .  In fac t ,  Costa Rica does not even have an army, 
the government disbanded it in the late 1940 ' s .
The purpose of this chapter is to show the adverse ef fec ts  of 
militarism that Mexico has not had or has since eliminated, as  opposed 
to other Latin American countries.  The writer does not intend to get 
involved in a lengthy country-by-country an a ly s is ,  but merely to present 
the general patterns of philosophy and action that have resulted from 
numerous studies on the sub ject .
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Latin American polit ics generally have been characterized by 
v io lence .  In the Latin American polit ical system, violence is an 
institutionalized method for the transfer of political power.
In Honduras, for instance,  from 1 8 2 4 -1 9 5 0 — a period of 126 
y e a r s —the executive off ice changed hands 116 t im es .  In a nine-year 
period ending in 1940,  Ecuador had fourteen presidents,  four of them 
during a single month. Since 1830, Venezuela has had twenty-six  
different constitutions.  In the present century, Venezuela cannot claim 
more than three honest e le c t io n s ,  the last  in 1963 . From 1830 to 1900, 
there were at leas t  fifty revolts .  The government was overthrown by 
violence on thirteen different o c ca s io n s .
With a few notable exceptions,  the single failure of the Latin 
American political system is its inability to provide for orderly and 
responsible transfer of power.  ̂ This pol it ical instabili ty has led to 
frequent military takeovers of the governments.
The reasoning behind the "coup" appears to be the same for all  the 
Latin American militaries in the last  fifty years ,  even though the political 
situation in each nation may vary. Bas ical ly  the military fee ls  that their 
actions are just ified to preserve internal order and stabili ty within their 
countries.  The fear of Communism, particularly that of Fidel Castro in 
recent  t im es ,  has provided a rationale for a takeover.  A traditional
^Peter Nehemkis,  Latin American Myth and Reality (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964),  p. 4 3 .
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feeling persists that they must get involved to save the country. The 
influence of nazism and fascism from World War II and the present day 
trend for a Nasser-type government has caused its share of takeovers.  
Underemployment and boredom have caused a few tak eo v ers . The 
military has justified takeovers with cries of corruption and ineffic iency 
on the part of the civilian authorities.  A few takeovers have been staged 
because a civilian regime appeared to be moving too fast  with soc ia l  
reforms.
The armed forces have generally held themselves above the law.
In most Latin American countries the armed forces in s is t ,  as regards 
military matters,  on being a state within a s ta te ,  demanding their com­
plete autonomy. As for pol i t ics ,  with the exception of only a few 
countries , they are above the state in claiming for themselves the right 
to change governments at will .  Since 193 0,  the military has represented 
a s ta t ic  or reactionary soc ia l  force,  a conservative holding action,  even
O
to the point of dissolving popular parties by force.
If there is a unifying force which binds the armed forces officer 
corps, it is a bas ic  hosti lity to the democratic p ro ces ses .  The pro­
fe ss ion a l  soldier 's  ordered and disciplined life has unquestionably made
^Edwin Lieuwen, "The Changing Role of the Armed Forces:  An 
A n aly s is , "  in Latin American P o l i t i c s , e d . by Robert D. Tomasek (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, I n c . ,  1966),  pp. 5 7 -6 0 .
^Ibid . , pp. 7 4 - 7 7 .
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it difficult for him to tolerate the unsettling ef fec ts  of soc ia l  change, and 
what he considers the "wasted effort" and deris iveness that accompanies 
the workings of the democratic process .^  This is in part the outgrowth 
of l i fe - long training in a hierarchical organization in which each element 
is subject  to command and obedience. It is a lso  the result of the con­
ditioning process of belonging to an establishment that has been set 
apart, which enjoys specia l  pr ivileges,  and, in some countries,  is the 
dominant power structure.® The armed forces of Latin America consider 
themselves a privileged c a s t e .  Where this militarism prevails ,  a s ,  for 
instance ,  in Peru, Guatemala, Bolivia,  Argentina, the military e s ta b l i s h ­
ments are in reality states  within s ta te s .  The civilian s ta te ,  when it is 
in e x is te n c e ,  is permitted to exerc ise  the formal show of government by 
occupying the seats  of government, but the c ivil ians never forget where 
the real power l i e s .  It seems the normal business  of the military in these 
countries is pol i t ics .® There are professional soldiers in Latin America 
who feel it is not their function to get involved in po l i t i cs ,  but they are 
outnumbered by the a c t iv i s t s .  Within the ranks of the armed forces are 
the younger officers who often lead and instigate these takeovers.  Many 
bel ieve in the need to modernize the country, which involves them so
^Ibid. ;  Johnson, "The Soldier as  C i t i z e n , "  p. 100.
®Nehemkis, Myth and Real i ty , p.  51.
®Ib id . ,  p . 52 .
57
deeply with the welfare of the nation that they feel  obliged to take
7
control .
The senior o ff icers ,  generals and co lonels ,  get involved, but 
usually they are out to maintain the status quo and often come in conflict  
with the young off icers over the issues .®
Once the military makes up its mind on a given i s s u e ,  nothing can 
prevent it from having their way. Their intervention, they b e l ieve ,  is 
always in the national interest— to save their country or to protect their 
institution, which they consider the very embodiment of nationhood. The 
armed forces of many Latin American countries are organizations with an
q
independent position on all  poli t ical i s s u e s .
In all  Latin American countries the off icer corps are very highly 
trained, most have extensive schooling at home and abroad. Graduates 
of the academies in Argentina and Chile ,  for example,  have the equiva­
lent of twelve to s ix teen years of training; Venezuela,  Ecuador and 
M e x i c o , ten to twelve years;  and in El Salvador and Honduras, six  to 
ten years ,  plus many have post-graduate train ing. ^  All this further
7
Tomasek, Latin American P o l i t i c s , p. 97 .
®Nehemkis, Myth and Real i ty , p. 50.
®Edwin Lieuwen, Generals Vs.  Presidents:  Neomilitarism in Latin 
America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,  1964),  p. 97 .
lOjohnson, "Soldier as  C i t iz e n , "  p. 102.
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enhances the desire to get involved in p o l i t i c s .  In some of these 
countries the military represents the largest  single educated group in 
the nation.
Despite this expert ise ,  there are st i l l  many mediocre officers and 
troops in these armies.  They repeatedly violate  the military codes and 
tincture their greed with vanity and personal gr ievances .  Nepotism is 
stil l  a factor in Latin American armed forces .  * 1
Traditionally the military of Latin America has been asso c ia ted  with 
the narrow ruling groups, often participating in power struggles with 
other e l i t e s ,  thus contributing little in the way to long range stabil ity.  ^  
This is one of the key areas in which the Mexican military is different. 
The Mexican army is from the masses  and has not aligned with the old 
ruling e l i t e !
The ef fec ts  of militarism in many Latin American countries have not 
been al l  negative; they have made contributions in terms of nation build­
ing. They have helped to nationalize,  s o c ia l iz e ,  and poli t ic ize sizable 
segments of the population. They have helped to develop their nation's 
economies,  participated to a great extent in mil itary-civ ic  action pro­
grams, while at the same time they have defended the b as ic  institutions 
of soc ie ty .  Also they have performed well in keeping Castroite
* 1Ibid. , p . 104 .
^Ronald  M. Schneider,  Latin American Panorama (New York: The 
Foreign Policy Association, I n c . ,  1966),  p.  18.
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insurregents and other Communist revolutionaries out of power. ^  Many 
Latin American military men have developed strong social  and economic 
consc iousness  to try to move their countries forward.
The writer would like to present four b a s ic  types of c ivil-mil itary 
relations in Latin America as suggested by L. N. McAlister.
(1) Praetorian S tate- -character ized by frequent overthrow of govern­
ments by military revolutions or coups d'etat for non-military purposes.
An example would be a country like Venezuela before and after the 
dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez.
(2) Gendarmist State— emerges when an individual uses a 
mercenary army to make himself master of the state and turn it into a 
gendarmery to maintain himself in power. Anastacio Somoza in 
Nicaraqua is an example of this type.
(3) Garrison State — in it the military not only dominates or strongly 
influences the polit ical system, but it attempts to militarize the state 
and society  at large. Paraquay under Francisco Solano Lopez is an 
example of this type.
(4) The Civil is t  State — it is characterized by c iv il  supremacy over 
the military and ex is t s  in relatively stable so c ie t ie s  with professionalized 
armed forces .  An example is Uruquay since the turn of this century.
These ,  of course ,  are ideal types .  They do not ex is t  in pure form
13 Ib id . , p . 20 .
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and may shade or blend one into the other, as  with the example of Rafael 
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic turning a Praetorian state into a 
gendarmist s ta te .  ^  Mexico would be placed in the last  c la ss i f ic a t io n ,  
but it should be added that the Mexican armed forces have a strong 
influence in the affairs of the nation.
The writer would like to present three types of roles played by the 
armed forces of Latin America as  suggested by Theodore W yckoff . The 
first is the country in which the military always plays a role in po l i t ics ,  
year in and year out.  Examples are Hait i ,  Honduras, Guatemala, 
Dominican Republic,  Nicaragua, and Paraquay. The second is the 
country in which the military never,  or almost n ev er , gets  involved. 
Examples are Costa Rica and Uruguay. The third type is the country in 
which the military occas ional ly  plays a poli t ical role .  Examples are 
Argentina, Bolivia,  Brazil ,  C hi le ,  Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Mexico , Panama, Peru, and Venezuela . ^
Poli t ical involvement by the Latin American military is neither 
transitory, nor iso la ted ,  nor exceptional .  It should be labeled as  what
^ L .  N. McAlister,  "C iv ic -M il i tary  Relations in Latin America, " 
in The Dynamics of Change in Latin American P o l i t i c s , ed. by John D. 
Martz (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . :  Prentice-Hall ,  I n c . ,  1965),  p. 256 .
^Theodore Wyckoff ,  "The Role of the Military in Latin America,"  
in The Dynamics of Change in Latin American P o l i t i c s , ed. by John D. 
Martz (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . :  Prentice-Hall ,  I n c . ,  1965),  p. 286 .
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14L. N. McAlister,  "C iv ic -M il i tary  Relations in Latin America , " 
in The Dynamics of Change in Latin American P o l i t i c s , ed. by John D. 
Martz (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . :  P ren t ice -H al l , I n c . ,  1965),  p. 256 .
15Theodore Wyckoff ,  "The Role of the Military in Latin America, " 
in The Dynamics of Change in Latin American P o l i t i c s , ed. by John D. 
Martz (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . :  Prent ice-H all ,  I n c . ,  1965),  p. 286 .
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it is :  institutionalized polit ical behavior.  ^  It must be looked upon as 
an independent pol it ical  force that competes with other polit ical inst itu­
tions and movements. In this c lash the military has the advantage, the 
voter cannot argue against  a machine gun.
The profession of arms is not necessar i ly  the best  school in which 
to learn the art of government. If governing were merely commanding, as 
the armed forces of Latin America b e l ieve ,  the role they assume would be 
ju s t i f i e d .  ̂^
The Mexican military as  stated earlier  has not suffered from these 
problems. Their armed forces have had a different evolution than other 
Latin American armies.  They are deeply involved in the system and have 
not set themselves off from the rest  of soc ie ty .  The different philosophy 
of the Mexican military has helped keep the Mexican armed forces  non­
violent and yet influential in national affa irs .
^ N e h em k is ,  Myth and Real i ty , p. 63.
1 7
Santos,  "Latin American R e a l i t i e s , "  p. 256 .
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In this chapter all  of the material developed through the paper will 
be summarized with five reasons which the writer considers as  an explana­
tion why the Mexican armed forces have found it unnecessary to attempt 
a coup d'etat in the las t  fifty years.
These reasons explaining this situation are:  (1) the military's 
relationship with the President of the Republic in their military role;
(2) their involvement in mil itary-civic  action programs; (3) their involve­
ment as  a privileged interest group; (4) the military philosophy of the 
Mexican armed forces;  (5) the favorable economic climate that ex is t s  
in Mexico today.
The first reason is the military's relationship with the President of 
the Republic,  the most powerful political figure in M exico .  The military 
has a strong bond of loyalty to and a c lo s e  relationship with the president 
of M exico .  There is a dependence on each other for support and recog­
nition. The Mexican military, l ike other Latin American mil itar ies ,  
prefers a strong central authority. This resembles the chain-of-command 
concept that armies thrive on. They do not care to h ass le  over many
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democratic governing procedures. With a central authority the military's 
role and mission are eas ier  to execu te .  The order is simply given and 
swiftly carried out. There is no waiting for formal declarations and 
congressional  approval. The military has influence in different ways,  
but none is more ef fect ive than their direct line to the president.  By 
supporting the president,  the military maintains a strong voice in the 
affairs of the nation, thus having no need to assume control of the 
government.
On the other s ide ,  the president needs the armed forces  for support 
in carrying out his decis ions  and programs. He has used the armed 
forces whenever he has a need for them, and he has used them often, 
as  the discussion in Chapter II indicated. In the future as  wel l ,  the 
president will ca l l  on the armed forces if he fe e ls  their services  are 
needed.
To insure their loyalty and support the president often lavishes  
praise on the armed forces .  He participates in many armed forces 
ac t iv i t ies  such as  military maneuvers,  military receptions and commence­
ments,  and his state of the union message usually includes mention of 
a ten per cent pay raise  as  w ell .
This bond of loyalty tying the military with the president will 
continue in the future. The only possib le  problem is if the president
■''Mexico, Informe que Rinde al H. Congreso de la Union (Mexico: 
Secretaria de Gobernacion, 1957-1963) .
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were to die in o f f ice .  Since the Mexican Constitution makes no pro­
vis ion for a vice  president,  the Mexican congress would have to se lec t  
a su cce sso r .  If a serious c r is is  were to develop over the se lection of a 
new president,  the military having the ability to act  quickly could con­
ceivably  assume control of the government until the c r is is  subsided. 
However as  long as the military has a strong voice in governmental 
affairs and in the selection of each new president,  a serious c r is is  is 
not l ikely to result .
A second reason is the area of mil itary-civ ic  action programs.
These programs keep the military very involved in the nat ion's affa irs .
The troops are kept busy with these programs besides  their normal 
military functions. The junior and middle grade off icers are a lso  deeply 
involved in the leadership of these a c t iv i t i e s .  The military develops a 
sense of helping to build the nation rather than just  defending i t .  There 
then is l e s s  time to complain and plot " c o u p s . "  By being occupied in 
these programs, besides  normal military duties,  the military is deeply 
involved, and it is this meaningful involvement that helps explain the 
present status of the Mexican military.
The third reason is the military's involvement as  an interest group, 
which is i l lustrated by their place in the party and their privileged 
position in soc ie ty .  The overall power of the revolutionary generals to 
act as  regional caudillos was eliminated during the presidency of General 
Cardenas.  The important factor in accomplishing this reduction of power
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was the giving of off ic ia l  representation to the military in the off icial  
party of the revolution. As stated before,  General Cardenas said: "We 
have not put the army in p o l i t i c s ,  it was already there.  In fac t ,  it had 
been dominating the situation and we did well  to reduce its influence 
to one vote out of four. " The merger of the army with the civilian power 
b locs  within the off ic ia l  party is an outgrowth of efforts by su cce ss iv e  
presidents ,  starting with General Cal les  who first brought the generals 
into the party and finalized under General Camacho's administration 
( 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 4 6 ) .2
The military no longer wheels  the absolute power it used to ,  but 
st il l  is one of the most powerful poli t ical b locs  in the nation, as  the 
discussion in Chapter III revealed.
The other aspect  is the privileged position of the military. Besides 
normal military priv ileges,  the civil ian authorities a lso  provide other 
incentives to help keep the military loyal and dedicated. The armed 
forces  are permitted to hold non-military posit ions,  they are offered 
fa c i l i t ies  for becoming businessmen,  the generals and other senior 
off icers are allowed to have fine homes, cars and private airplanes.  
Besides these ranking off icers are allowed to practice graft by padding 
troop rolls to co l lec t  wages for more men than serve under them. All
2 Nehemkis,  Myth and Real i ty , p. 54.
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this has helped assure their loyalty to the government.^ Many military 
men have obtained such wealth and position during their careers ,  that 
to upset the apple cart in any way would be absurd.
The fourth reason is the philosophy of the Mexican military which 
differs from other Latin American armies.
The Mexican military does not see i tse l f  as  a privileged c a s t e ,  
above the law, with the right to change governments at w i l l .  The military 
has never been allowed to become a completely independent institution 
set off by i tse l f  from society  like other Latin American armies.
By the time the revolutionary army was unified into a permanent 
organized force ,  it was already deeply embedded in the affairs of 
government and party. The Mexican armed forces has not,  in a s e n s e ,  
had time to develop the independent "holier than thou" attitudes that 
prevail in other Latin American armies.  The Mexican military, being 
integrated into the system, has learned to work in harmony with 
c iv i l ia n s .  They are not as  impatient with civilian poli t ics  and demo­
cratic  p rac t ice s .
The Mexican military se es  i t se l f  a s  a balance and stabilizer  for 
the nation. The rea l i t ies  of military intervention in a c r is is  or the 
poss ib i l i t ies  of a direct military takeover helps to insure a smoothly 3
3
Casanova, La Democracia en M e x ic o , pp. 5 0 -5 3 ;  Herring,
"Mexico Today, " p. 225; Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin 
America, p . 166 .
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run polit ical system, with all  elements of the society  pledging loyalty to 
the president and the government. Obviously being involved indicates 
they must bel ieve in the system, and, if they do, why try to destroy it?
The final reason is M exico 's  prospering economy. Over the years 
the economy has been steadily gaining to the point where Mexico has 
achieved the necessary  economic "takeoff"  to have annual growth rates 
of 6 .5  per cent a year which ranks third in the world. M ex ico 's  gross 
national product has increased every year,  and the per capita gross 
national product has a lso  increased yearly.  Mexico has been reinvesting 
about 15 per cent  of her gross national product every year.  All areas of 
Mexican business  and industry are expanding. The standard of living 
is on the r i se .^  The tourist income, mostly from the United Sta tes ,  rose 
16 .9  per cent  over las t  year 's  to about $42 5 million. There is very low 
inflation in Mexico and the balance of payments had a surplus of $50 
million las t  year .  The Mexican peso is one of the strongest currencies 
on the international market at the present time.^ Past leaders of Mexico 
have been intelligent enough to have combined the desirable asp e c ts  of 
both capitalism and socia lism to fit M ex ico 's  system of government and 
life s ty le ,  rather than to attempt to duplicate any one model to M ex ico 's  
needs .  In a sense  it is this prospering economy that underlies everything
^New York T im e s , October 16, 1969, p. 50.
5New York T im es , January 6,  1969, p. 95;  Newsweek, August 7, 
1967,  p. 30; U . S .  News & World Report, October 9 ,  1966, p. 53 .
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that has happened in Mexico and with the military. The military has a 
share in this prosperity, and enjoying it along with the other elements 
of soc ie ty ,  have no need to disrupt it..
All of the above reasons demonstrate the involvement of the 
Mexican military in the affairs of the nation. Through all  their a c t iv i t i e s ,  
the military has developed a strong sense of nationhood and a desire to 
see Mexico continue its development into a modern industrial nation.
This involvement has given them a strong voice in the decision making 
process .  As long as  the nation is achieving its ob ject ives  and continues 
to prosper,  the armed forces are not going to rock the boat with
irresponsible military ventures .
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